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How and when to exit portfolio company investments are critical choices facing private equity funds. In
this paper we analyze 1022 European private equity exits, using information on fund and portfolio
company characteristics, and on conditions in capital markets. For over 43% of the exits, private equity
funds sold to each other and we analyze why such secondary buyouts have gained in popularity relative
to IPOs and sales to corporate acquirers. We ﬁnd that the exit route depends on various portfolio
company characteristics, and that conditions in the debt and equity markets have a strong inﬂuence
on exit choice. The existing literature has tended to portray the IPO is the ‘‘preferred’’ exit route.
However, our analysis suggests this is mistaken: private equity funds take advantage of ‘windows of
opportunity’, and the exit route that maximizes value varies with market conditions.
 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction than another private equity fund – is very uncertain. InvestorsExiting portfolio company investments is one of the most criti-
cal choices faced by private equity funds. Yet little is known about
the timing of exit decisions or the choice of the exit route – which
are broadly IPO, sale to another company (‘‘trade sale’’) or sale to
another private equity fund (‘‘secondary exit’’). The aim of this
paper is to ﬁll this gap and provide insights into the timing of pri-
vate equity exits, and the choices made by private equity ﬁrms.
Previous research has tended to focus on the IPO as an exit route
(Lerner, 1994; Murray, 1994; Barry et al., 1990; Giot and
Schwienbacher, 2007). However, IPOs are relatively uncommon,
with the vast majority of private equity exits being trade or sec-
ondary sales. Furthermore, the recent growth of secondary
buy-outs has generated considerable controversy. As we show,
around 43% of all exits were secondary sales in recent years.
Some commentators refer to these as ‘‘pass the parcel’’ deals,
implying that the ultimate value of the company – once the music
stops and the true value is revealed by a sale to someone other(the Limited Partners in the fund, or LPs) often complain about
such deals. In particular, when an LP is an investor in both the sell-
ing and acquiring fund, they continue to hold a stake in the com-
pany, but have paid often signiﬁcant transactions fees and, in
some cases, will have crystalized a proﬁt share (or ‘‘carried inter-
est’’, which is typically 20% of the proﬁts) for the exiting private
equity manager (the General Partner, or GP).
Given the way private equity funds are incentivized, in particu-
lar the fact that they earn carried interest provided the fund beats a
hurdle rate expressed in terms of the whole fund internal rate of
return (IRR), the timing of the exit cannot be divorced from the
route chosen. A rapid exit will boost the IRR, and so private equity
funds will, to some extent, trade off the immediacy, and certainty,
of an exit route with maximizing value. An important contribution
of this paper is to analyze the time-to-exit dynamics, using a haz-
ard function framework. Although much of the literature asserts
that IPOs are associated with ‘‘successful’’ exits, they do not result
in quick, or certain, proceeds for private equity funds, given the
requirement for their stakes to be locked-up for at least 6 months,
and the difﬁculty of disposing of signiﬁcant stakes.1 Secondary
sales are relatively quick, the proceeds are certain and, unlike tradelative to
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they seldom involve regulatory issues. Consequently, secondary
sales are often welcomed by LPs. The controversy regarding sec-
ondary transactions is, therefore, mainly focused on the purchasing
GP. Why are they buying a company that has already been worked
on actively by another GP for several years?2
To analyze these issues, the paper focuses on exits of European
private equity leveraged buyouts (LBOs) between January 2000
and December 2014 using a very large (self-collected) sample of
1022 portfolio companies.3 Previous studies as Sudarsanam (2005)
studied the exit choice for 104 UK LBOs investments and found that
operating performance, ﬁrm size, length of holding period and
whether the ﬁrm belonged to the ‘high-tech’ industry were all signif-
icant determinants of the exit strategy. Wang (2012) also studies UK
secondary exits. As Wang only has data on a relatively small number
of companies she does not differentiate between IPOs and trade sales
as alternative exit routes.4 Using our much larger pan-European
dataset we are able to identify the main factors that inﬂuence
whether private equity funds choose to exit via IPO, trade sale, or
a sale to another ﬁnancial buyer. Cumming and MacIntosh
(2003b), focus mainly on the determinants of a partial exit, as
opposed to a full exit, within the full range of exit vehicles and found
that the greater the degree of information asymmetry between the
private equity ﬁrm and the buyer, the greater the likelihood of a
partial exit and suggested that partial exits were used as a signal
of a portfolio company’s quality.
This paper considers three sets of factors – which are likely to
interact – that could inﬂuence the timing of exit and the choice
of exit route.
First, we investigate the impact of market conditions. Private
equity ﬁrms want to achieve the best exit price possible and capital
market conditions may create different ‘windows of opportunity’.
For instance, higher availability of funds in the loan market, a
‘‘cold’’ IPO market or large amounts of capital committed but not
yet invested in the private equity industry may make secondary
buy-outs the most proﬁtable exit route. Consistent with this
hypothesis, Axelson et al. (2013) ﬁnd that a higher availability of
debt (measured by leverage multiples – Total Debt/EBITDA5 – used
in leverage buyouts) has a strong impact on the prices of deals as pri-
vate equity ﬁrms borrow as much as they can for each deal.
Shivdasani and Wang (2011) also document the important impact
of credit markets and securitization, and show that the LBO boom
in the years before the ﬁnancial crisis was largely fuelled by cheap
debt with few covenants.6 Therefore favorable debt market condi-
tions may increase the likelihood of a secondary buy-out transaction.
On the equity side, the well-documented cycles in the number
of initial public offerings (and in the initial returns of such IPOs)
also suggest the existence of windows of opportunity in the public
equity markets.7 For instance, whilst relatively few private equity
exits to public markets were observed in the years following the
ﬁnancial crisis, there was a ﬂurry of private equity-backed IPOs
during 2014.2 Achleitner and Figge (2014) and Bonini (2015) have analyzed the sources of value
creation for secondary buyouts. Guo et al. (2011) and Harford and Kolasinski (2013)
study value creation in buyouts more generally, irrespective of the chosen exit route.
A summary of evidence regarding ﬁnancial performance of buyouts in general can be
found in Cumming et al. (2007).
3 We focus on buyouts as entry and exit are much easier to observe compared with
venture capital deals where there can be multiple rounds of investing and divesting.
4 Wang (2012) only identiﬁes 5 IPOs in her UK sample; we have 142 in our broader
European sample.
5 EBITDA – Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization.
6 Also, as noted by Groh and Gottschalg (2011), buyout transactions tend to happen
in lower risk industries, and so the availability of leverage becomes important to
generate higher returns (even if not on a risk-adjusted basis).
7 See for instance Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984) and Lowry and Schwert
(2002).The second set of factors we consider relate to the private
equity fund structure. As noted earlier, private equity investing is
generally carried out through partnerships/funds that have a con-
tractually ﬁnite life, normally ten years, which can be extended
only with the consent of the LPs. Moreover, private equity ﬁrms
set up new funds approximately every three to ﬁve years and a
good track record for timely exits as well as past performance
are crucial to enhancing a ﬁrm’s reputation and future fundraising
(Phalippou (2008)). Therefore, when a private equity fund is near
the end of its contractual life, the GP faces pressure to realize
investments.8 Consistent with this observation, Masulis and
Nahata (2009) found in the case of trade sales that the returns of
the purchasing company are, on average, higher when the selling
private equity fund is closer to maturity. Cumming and MacIntosh
(2003a) conjecture that as the fund approaches its maturity, there
may be portfolio companies that are not yet ready for a public offer-
ing or a strategic sale, which may make a secondary sale attractive,
insofar as it can avoid having to request an extension on the life
fund.
More benignly, GPs have different specializations. Some are
focused on earlier stages of investment and others on expansion
or late-stage investments, and so the recent wave of secondary
buy-outs may have occurred because portfolio companies matured
and grew and so were sold to other private equity ﬁrms that focus
on such companies.9 In this case we might expect the two private
equity ﬁrms involved in a secondary transaction should differ in
terms of their experience, specialization, etc. Therefore, these vari-
ous characteristics such as the holding period of the investment,
how close the fund is to maturity, and the experience or specializa-
tion of the private equity fund may inﬂuence exit choice.
The ﬁnal set of factors we consider relate to the portfolio com-
pany. It may be that some companies are more suited to particular
exit routes. For instance, companies which can operate with high
levels of debt – due to stable cash-ﬂows or low investment needs
– may be particularly suitable for continued private equity owner-
ship, and somore likely to realize a secondaryexit. And, emphasizing
the point that these sets of factors can interact, the probability of a
secondary exit for such a company would be expected to increase
further when debt market conditions are favorable. Or it could be
that ﬁrms have different monitoring needs, as suggested by Bienz
and Leite (2008). In theirmodel highly proﬁtable companies –which
require lessmonitoring – aremore likely to be exited through an IPO
whereas less proﬁtable companies are exited via a trade sale. We
explore whether such ﬁrm characteristics can explain exit choices.
Our main results are as follows. First, our analysis suggests that
capital market conditions are the most important determinant of
the exit route. Private equity funds exploit the windows of oppor-
tunity that open at different times. For instance, in 2006–07 the
extraordinary conditions in the credit market made possible the
use of higher levels of debt in European buy-outs. Furthermore,
the huge amount of capital that was committed to private equity
before the ﬁnancial crisis led to a shift in demand. Together these
factors made private equity ﬁrms willing to pay more for portfolio
companies, which increased their bargaining power relative to cor-
porate acquirers, and resulted in a high proportion of secondary
sales.
Second, we ﬁnd an important role for portfolio company charac-
teristics. In particular, as would be expected, secondary buy-outs
are more likely when the portfolio company’s characteristics8 Arcot et al. (2015) use an exit in year 9 or 10 of the life of the private equity fund
as a sign that the GP is ‘‘under pressure’’.
9 ‘‘If you have different funds with different strategies, it’s natural that ﬁrms will
want to buy and sell to each other’’ says Ross Marshall of Dunedin Capital Partners in
September 2001 and ‘‘[P]rivate equity bosses say secondary buy-outs can be a way to
take a company to a new level’’ in Financial Times (4th November 2010).
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company more able to bear signiﬁcant amounts of debt in their
capital structure.
Third, regarding fund characteristics we ﬁnd evidence that
experienced private equity ﬁrms tend to sell to the less experi-
enced, and that that secondary deals tend to happen at a later point
in the life of the purchasing fund than primary deals. This suggests
that secondary purchases might be a quick way of using up com-
mitted capital towards the end of the fund investment period.
We also ﬁnd evidence that IPOs are used as an early exit route,
which is consistent with the view that IPOs can be attractive as
marketing devices for raising a subsequent fund. However, the data
also suggests that, if private equity ﬁrms cannot perform a public
offering within a short period after the initial investment, they
may prefer to exit through a secondary buy-out to keep their
investment periods short, so as to realize high IRRs and facilitate
fundraising. These results suggest that exit choices are, to some
extent, driven by the private equity ﬁrms’ desire to raise their next
fund, which may conﬂict with the interest of their investors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
explains how the sample is constructed, summarizes the data,
and analyzes the time-to-exit decision using a survival analysis
framework. A multivariate econometric model for exit route choice
is presented in section 3. Section 4 compares the characteristics of
the private equity ﬁrms that participate as vendors or purchasers
in secondary buy-outs. Section 5 concludes.2. Data construction and sample characteristics
2.1. Sample construction
One of the main issues concerning private equity research is the
availability of data. Because private equity-backed companies are
not publicly traded they do not have the same obligations regarding
the disclosure of information as publicly traded companies. This is
particularly problematic for U.S. companies (except those that have
issued public bonds). However, European companies are still
required to ﬁle accounting statements in the public domain. In this
paper, therefore, we focus on European portfolio companies, as
deﬁned by the country of their headquarters; we make no restric-
tions on the country of origin of the private equity fund.
The dataset used in this paper is assembled from several
sources and databases in a complex and multi-step process.10
The initial universe consists of all European private equity invest-
ments11 that exited through a public offering, a trade sale or a
secondary buy-out between January 2000 and December 2014.12
We are limited in going back before 2000 as it is very difﬁcult to
get accounting statements before that date. We then restrict the
sample to those investments where it is possible to (i) identify
the private equity ﬁrm(s) and fund(s) involved, (ii) identify the
entry deal (merger/acquisition or a private placement) date, and
(iii) obtain accounting data for the year before the exit.
The ﬁrst step in building the database is to identify private
equity exits. For this two databases are used, S&P Capital IQ and
Private Equity Insight. These databases complement each other10 A more detailed explanation of this process is available upon request.
11 The deﬁnition of private equity investments, in the study, excludes venture
capital investments.
12 Liquidations were dropped because, in order to exclude venture capital invest-
ments the sample only includes exits with transaction (exit) value higher than $50 m
(£25 m) and the low (or even zero) value of a liquidation would mean that none of
these transactions would have made the cut off. Buy-backs were dropped because
they either are used as a subsequent exit (after an initial public offering) or in small,
venture capital type investments. And ﬁnally, dividend recapitalizations were
dropped because they are not an exit per se, but combine a cash distribution with a
balance sheet restructuring.and so combining them provides a broad and representative sam-
ple of private equity exits. Using these databases, it is possible to
identify 1023 secondary buy-outs, 1231 trade sales and 313 initial
public offerings, in a total of 2567 private equity exits, occurring
between January 2000 and December 2014.
The second step involves gathering detailed transaction/exit
data. Thomson Venture Expert (TVE) and S&P Capital IQ are used
to identify the selling private equity ﬁrms and funds involved in
each transaction and their characteristics, such as the year the pri-
vate equity was founded, the fund vintage year and the fund size.
When more than one private equity ﬁrm is identiﬁed in the same
transaction, if one of the private equity ﬁrms led the transaction
(retained a higher percentage of shares on the deal) only the infor-
mation about the leader and their fund is used. If none of the pri-
vate equity ﬁrms receive more shares than the other(s) or no
information about that aspect is available, information on all pri-
vate equity ﬁrms and funds data is obtained and the data on ﬁrm
and fund characteristics is averaged.
S&P Capital IQ, TVE and Zephyr13 are used to obtain information
about the entry deal date. Accounting data is collected from FAME,
AMADEUS and ORBIS,14 and occasionally from S&P Capital IQ. Only
the deals for which accounting data regarding the portfolio company
is available for at least the year before the exit are retained.
Information about the portfolio company’s founding year is collected
from S&P Capital IQ, TVE or the Internet.
From the 2567 private equity exits identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step we
are able to collect the data required for 446 secondary buy-outs,
434 trade sales (to either publicly-listed or private companies)
and 142 public offerings, producing a total of 1022 private equity
exits. Fig. 1 shows the exit route distribution by year. These exits
represent our sample for the remainder of the paper. Table 1
reports the nationality (Panel A) and the industry (Panel B) of the
sample portfolio companies and Table 2 shows the (selling) private
equity ﬁrms involved. 28 European countries and more than 300
private equity ﬁrms are represented in this sample, with the UK
accounting for almost one-half of the portfolio companies. We
believe this to be the most comprehensive sample of European pri-
vate equity exits yet collected.
Information about the local stock market return index is col-
lected from the relevant stock exchange websites. Capital commit-
ted to private equity funds and not yet invested is obtained from
Preqin. Finally, three different measures of debt market conditions
are collected. The FED tightening Index15 is collected from the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System website and represents
the net percentage of domestic banks that have tightened standards
for Commercial and Industrial (C&I) Loans in a quarter. Finally,
monthly interest margins on leveraged loans and leverage multiples
in European buy-outs are obtained from S&P Capital IQ’s Leveraged
Commentary and Data (LCD).
2.2. Summary statistics
Table 3 provides summary information for the 1022 deals. The
average holding period of all deals is just over 4 years. This is
slightly longer than the 3.7 years found by Schwienbacher
(2008a) and in the middle of the 3–5 year interval suggested by
Fenn et al. (1997). On average, private equity funds make their
investments about two years into the life of the fund (25.0 months)
and exit their investments after around six years (76.2 months).
Not surprisingly, holding periods increased noticeably after the13 Zephyr contains information on deals, such as merger and acquisitions and IPOs.
14 FAME, AMADEUS and ORBIS contain information on public and private companies
for the UK & Ireland, Europe and the rest of the world (respectively). FAME,
AMADEUS, ORBIS and Zephyr are managed by Bureau van Dijk.
15 Senior Loan Ofﬁcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices. For more information
on this survey, see www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey.
Fig. 1. Exits distribution by route and year. This ﬁgure shows our sample of 1022 private equity exits by route and year.
Table 1
Sample description. This table gives details about the 1022 exits of European
companies, which occurred between January 2000 and December 2014. Panel A sorts
the sample by portfolio company nationality (according to the location of their
headquarters) and according to whether their exit route was an initial public offering
(IPO), secondary sale to another private equity fund (Sec) or a trade sale to a corporate
acquirer (TS). Nationality means the country where the portfolio company has its
headquarters. Panel B sorts the sample by broad industrial classiﬁcation and by exit
route.
Country Exit route
IPO Sec TS Total
Panel A: Nationality of portfolio companies and exit routes
United Kingdom 64 198 182 444
France 13 84 53 150
Sweden 11 23 36 70
Germany 12 28 27 67
Italy 4 34 27 65
Spain 3 14 19 36
Netherlands 3 15 16 34
Norway 8 13 12 33
Finland 2 8 16 26
Denmark 2 10 7 19
Belgium 2 5 8 15
Ireland 5 1 4 10
Austria 4 2 2 8
Other 15 9 11 25 45
Industry IPO Sec TS Total
Panel B: Industrial classiﬁcation of portfolio companies
Agriculture and Mining 4 6 12 22
Construction 2 8 9 19
Manufacturing 55 182 178 415
Transportation and Communication 10 33 51 94
Retail and Wholesale Trade 22 67 47 136
Financial and Other services 49 150 137 336
Table 2
Sample description: Exits by selling private equity ﬁrm. This table reports the selling
private equity ﬁrm and exit routes used in the 1022 exits of European companies
which occurred between January 2000 and December 2014. If more than one private
equity ﬁrm was involved and none was the leader (got a higher percentage of shares
on the deal) all private equity ﬁrms were considered.
Private equity ﬁrm Exit route
IPO Sec TS Total
3i Group 15 34 41 90
Bridgepoint Capital 2 20 18 40
Apax Partners 11 11 15 37
Barclays Private Equity 1 18 8 27
EQT Partners 9 9 9 27
CVC Capital Partners 6 9 9 24
Cinven 3 10 8 21
Industri Kapital 2 9 9 20
Nordic Capital 4 7 8 19
Carlyle Group 3 9 7 19
Candover Investments 2 8 7 17
Permira 3 9 5 17
Other 297 87 340 317 744
Table 3
Summary Statistics for the entire sample. This table reports the summary statistics for
deal holding period, characteristics of private equity investors and funds involved,
target portfolio company’s age, size and operating performance, at the time of exit, for
1022 deals exited between January 2000 and December 2014 (dollars in millions).
Variables Average Median Std. deviation N
Panel A: Deal and PE investor
Holding period (months) 51.2 48.1 25.8 1022
Fund maturity (months) 76.2 72.9 31.5 979
Fund size $938.0 $455.7 $1,360.4 981
PE age at exit (years) 20.3 20.0 9.7 1022
Panel B: Portfolio company
Age at exit (years) 37.8 21.5 41.6 1022
Total assets $328.0 $97.4 $846.5 1022
Turnover $320.2 $108.7 $819.1 1019
EBIT $25.5 $9.3 $81.7 1022
EBIT margin 8.94% 13.29% 12.33% 1017
Asset turnover ratio 1.51 1.23 1.29 1019
CAPEX $23.4 $5.1 $151.2 942
CAPEX/Total assets 9.48% 6.92% 12.01% 941
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lion ($456 million) while the private equity ﬁrms have on average,
at the time of the exit, around 20 years of experience.16
Regarding the target portfolio companies, in the year before the
exit they have average (median) book assets of $328 million ($97
million), sales of $320 million ($109 million) and EBIT of $25 mil-
lion ($9.3 million).
In Table 4 we differentiate between exit routes. Panel A shows
that investments exited through a secondary buy-out are held for
an average (median) of 52.7 months (49.5 months), compared with
51.8 months (48.5) and 44.7 months (42.2) for trade sales and IPOs
respectively. The holding period differences between the16 If the private equity ﬁrm was founded before 1970, we use 1970 as the founding
year, as little activity existed in the European private equity industry before that date.sub-sample of deals exited through an IPO and the sub-sample of
deals exited through a secondary buyout are statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level. Panel A also reports the maturity of the private
equity fund at the point of exit. Secondary buy-outs are exited later
in the fund life (78 months) than investments exited through a
trade sale (76.5 months) or through an IPO (70 months). The differ-
ence between IPOs and secondary buy-outs is statistically
Table 4
Summary Statistics for each exit subsample. This table reports descriptive statistics and the macroeconomics variables at the time of the exit for the 446 deals exited through a
secondary buy-out, the 434 deals exited through a trade sale and the 142 deals exited through a public offering, between January 2000 and December 2014 involving European
companies. In the last two cases, the table also reports the differences to the sub-sample of deals exited through a secondary buyout, using the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum
(Mann–Whitney) test. *, **, *** indicate that the two sub-samples are signiﬁcantly different at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The accounting data in Panel B relates to the
last full-year accounts prior to the exit. All reported dollar values are in millions.
Variables Secondary buy-out Trade sale IPO
Average Median Average Median z Average Median z
Panel A: Deal and PE investor
Holding period (months) 52.7 49.5 51.8 48.5 1.16 44.7 42.2 3.82⁄⁄⁄
Fund maturity (months) 78.1 74.2 76.5 72.7 1.10 69.8 68.2 2.73⁄⁄⁄
Fund size $920.0 $458.7 $880.8 $416.0 1.21 $1,168.5 $608.0 2.09⁄⁄
PE age at exit (years) 20.0 20.0 20.6 20.0 0.76 20.2 20.0 0.15
Panel B: Portfolio company
Age at exit (years) 40.2 25.0 34.7 18.0 3.05⁄⁄⁄ 39.6 17.5 1.70⁄
Total assets $290.4 $113.0 $262.7 $72.2 4.42⁄⁄⁄ $645.9 $122.3 0.42
Turnover $292.7 $135.6 $263.8 $81.9 4.79⁄⁄⁄ $582.1 $149.8 0.37
EBIT $24.3 $12.5 $18.4 $6.5 6.10⁄⁄⁄ $51.1 $9.4 1.52
EBIT margin 10.7% 14.2% 8.3% 12.7% 2.88⁄⁄⁄ 5.4% 12.4% 3.53⁄⁄⁄
Asset turnover ratio 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.3 0.77 1.4 1.1 1.48
CAPEX $20.6 $5.9 $18.5 $3.8 2.62⁄⁄⁄ $48.0 $11.9 2.41⁄⁄⁄
CAPEX/Total assets 8.5% 6.0% 8.6% 6.9% 0.20 15.4% 11.6% 4.83⁄⁄⁄
Panel C: Macroeconomics
Local stock market return 2.5% 3.3% 2.2% 2.8% 0.89 4.5% 3.7% 1.67⁄
Capital commitment index return 3.1% 4.0% 2.5% 2.7% 2.74⁄⁄⁄ 2.6% 3.0% 2.20⁄⁄
Margins on BB loans 2.36p.p. 2.03p.p. 2.55p.p. 2.31p.p. 4.03⁄⁄⁄ 2.47p.p. 2.27p.p. 2.16⁄⁄
Fed tightening index 4.5% 8.8% 1.4% 8.8% 1.10 1.0% 8.8% 1.93⁄
Leverage multiple 5.01 4.98 4.92 4.79 2.27⁄⁄ 4.88 4.82 2.39⁄⁄
Table 5
Exit distribution along the private equity fund life. This table reports the distribution
of the different exits (secondary buy-out, trade sale and public offering) along the
fund’s life.
Years since the vintage year Exit
Secondary buy-out Trade sale IPO
1–2 0.04 0.05 0.08
3–4 0.19 0.20 0.25
5–6 0.34 0.34 0.31
7–8 0.25 0.22 0.26
9–10 0.12 0.11 0.07
+10 0.06 0.07 0.03
18 Contrary to their model, the holding period variable is not right-censored since all
deals have been exited at the time of data collection. For more detail on survival
T. Jenkinson, M. Sousa / Journal of Banking & Finance 59 (2015) 399–408 403signiﬁcant. IPOs tend to be used more by larger funds (more than
$1 billion), but the experience of private equity ﬁrms is not related
to the choice of exit route.
Table 4 Panel B provides summary information on speciﬁc char-
acteristics of portfolio companies. Companies that exit through a
secondary buy-out are signiﬁcantly older (40.2 years) than those
using a trade sale (34.7 years) or an IPO (39.6 years). Consistent
with the ﬁnding of Sudarsanam (2005), companies using secondary
exits are, in the year before the exit, also more proﬁtable – having
an average (median) EBIT margin (EBIT/Turnover) equal to 10.7%
(14.2%). By contrast, those portfolio companies that exit through
an IPO tend to be larger, to invest the highest proportion of total
assets (15.4%) and have the lowest proﬁtability in terms of EBIT
margin.
These results suggest that exit via a secondary buy-out is more
likely to be used for mature portfolio companies with higher
capacity to generate cash-ﬂow and earnings (to support signiﬁcant
levels of debt) and for companies that require less investment.
Axelson et al. (2013) show that the macro economy is an impor-
tant determinant of exit route. We summarize macroeconomic
conditions at the time of exit in Table 4 Panel C. IPOs tend to be
used after periods of strong returns: markets increase, on average,
by 4.5% during the 3–6 month period before the public offering.1717 All macroeconomics variables are recorded in the quarter before the exit because
such decisions are made some time before the transaction closes.This is consistent with the existence of IPO windows of opportunity
when shareholders take advantage of ‘‘hot’’ IPO markets. Secondary
buy-outs are most frequent during periods when private equity fund
have raised (but not yet spent) large amounts of capital, and when
credit is cheap and lending conditions are loose. This tends to sug-
gest the existence of secondary buy-out ‘windows of opportunity’
during which the secondary exit route leads to higher returns.
Table 5 summarizes how exit routes vary over the fund life.
Masulis and Nahata (2009) conclude that private equity investors
face a liquidity pressure as their funds approach maturity. In our
sample 64% of IPO exits happen during the ﬁrst six years of a
fund, 26% during the seventh and eighth years, and only 10%
happen after the eight year. In the case of secondary buyouts
and trade sales, the majority of exits also happen between the
ﬁfth and the eighth years of the fund’s life, but 6% occur after
the tenth year.
2.3. Hazard functions
In order to understand exit dynamics during the life of the fund,
we next analyze the time-to-exit using a survival analysis frame-
work, similar to that employed by Giot and Schwienbacher
(2007).18 The hazard function gives the conditional instantaneous
probability of exit given that the deal has not been exited at that
speciﬁc time (the hazard rate)19
kðtÞ ¼ lim
Dt!0
Prðt 6 T < t þ DtjT P tÞ
Dt
 
¼ f ðtÞ
SðtÞ ¼ 
S0ðtÞ
SðtÞ ð1Þ
Where
S(t) = Pr (T > t) = 1  F(t) (survivor function)
F(t) = Pr (T 6 t) (exit time distribution function)
f(t) = dF(t)/dt (density function of exit time distribution)analysis and/or hazard models see Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) and Cameron and
Trivedi (2005).
19 Also called the intensity function, the conditional failure rate or the inverse Mills
ratio, ‘‘is the instantaneous rate of failure’’ (Cleves et al., 2010).
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Fig. 2. Hazard functions by exit. This ﬁgure shows the hazard functions for the IPO, secondary buy-outs and trade sale exits. The hazard function gives the conditional
instantaneous probability of exit given that the deal has not been exited at that speciﬁc time.
Table 6
Cox model. This table reports the estimated coefﬁcients of a Cox proportional hazard model for all and each of the exits (secondary buy-out, trade sale and public offering). The
explain variable is the investment time-to-exit (holding period) and the private equity ﬁrm experience (proxy by the ﬁrm’s age at beginning of the deal), the private equity fund
size, fund maturity when the deal was initiated, the portfolio company’s size (proxy by the total book value of assets in the last year before the deal was initiated), the portfolio
company’s age at beginning of the deal are used as explicative variables. Country, exit year and industry ﬁxed effects are included. Standard errors are reported under the
coefﬁcients in parenthesis and *, **, *** indicate levels that are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Variables Exit
All Secondary buy-out Trade sale IPO
ln (PE ﬁrm age at entry) 0.058 0.077 0.000 0.146
(0.048) (0.073) (0.088) (0.184)
ln (fund maturity at entry) 0.172⁄⁄⁄ 0.141⁄⁄ 0.164⁄⁄⁄ 0.544⁄⁄⁄
(0.038) (0.061) (0.059) (0.167)
ln (fund size) 0.143⁄⁄⁄ 0.094⁄ 0.193⁄⁄ 0.351⁄⁄
(0.033) (0.049) (0.055) (0.144)
ln (portfolio company age at entry) 0.054⁄⁄ 0.071⁄ 0.027 0.204⁄⁄
(0.024) (0.039) (0.041) (0.082)
ln (portfolio company total assets) 0.071⁄⁄⁄ 0.022 0.106⁄⁄ 0.178⁄⁄
(0.026) (0.043) (0.046) (0.073)
Country and exit year ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included
Industry ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 882 386 369 127
LR Chi2 150.45⁄⁄⁄ 55.26⁄ 82.44⁄⁄⁄ 105.95⁄⁄
‘‘Other sectors’’ is the base industry dummy.
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provide some interesting evidence on the dynamics of the exit pro-
cess. First, the exit probabilities are broadly similar for the ﬁrst
90 months of the fund, although trade sales are generally less likely
during this initial period. Second, thereafter the probability of con-
ducting an IPO drops off sharply, with secondary buyouts becom-
ing by far the most likely exit route. Third, as funds head
towards ﬁnal liquidation, the remaining companies are sold to
trade purchasers, with no instances of IPOs or secondary sales after
the 10-year point.
The survival analysis can be extended using a Cox proportional
hazard model20 where hazard rates depend on a set of covariates
that can be viewed as explanatory variables:20 This model is a semi-parametric model that makes no assumptions about the
form of the baseline hazard function, k0(t), which does not have to be speciﬁed. This
fact makes the Cox model considerably ﬂexible and widely used.kðtÞ ¼ k0ðtÞ  eðb0þb1 :X1þb2 :X2þ...þbk :XkÞ ð2Þ
The explanatory variables we include are the private equity ﬁrm
experience, the fund size and maturity when the deal was initiated,
the portfolio company’s size (proxied by the total book value of
assets), and the portfolio company’s age at beginning of the deal.
Industry, exit year and country ﬁxed effect are also included.
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. The model shows –
as expected, given the limited life of a fund – that investments ini-
tiated later in the life of the fund take less time to be exited. Larger
funds tend to exit their investments more quickly. Regarding port-
folio company characteristics, older companies tend to be exited
more quickly, and larger portfolio companies exited more slowly.
We ﬁnd no evidence that the experience of the GP has a signiﬁcant
effect on the speed of exit.
This section has looked in detail at the timing of the exit deci-
sion, for each exit route. In the next section we switch focus to
the exit decision itself.
Table 7
Trinomial Logistic Model. This table reports the maximum-likelihood trinomial logistic regression results for the full sample of 1022 exits. The dependent variable is the exit route
and the secondary buy-out exit is the base (comparing) group. Exogenous variables are deﬁned in Appendix. Standard errors are reported under the coefﬁcients in parenthesis.
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. ‘+’ indicates a winsorized variable at 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
TS IPO TS IPO TS IPO TS IPO
Deal an PE variables ln (fund maturity) 0.353⁄⁄ 0.538⁄⁄ 0.039 0.017
(0.165) (0.228) (0.182) (0.273)
ln (fund size) 0.140⁄⁄ 0.124 0.011 0.277⁄⁄⁄
(0.058) (0.087) (0.065) (0.103)
ln (pe age) 0.371⁄⁄⁄ 0.032 0.227 0.010
(0.141) (0.198) (0.147) (0.224)
PC variables ln (pc age) 0.112 0.018 0.081 0.030
(0.079) (0.118) (0.080) (0.117)
ln (total assets) 0.166⁄⁄⁄ 0.022 0.148⁄⁄ 0.022
(0.057) (0.081) (0.060) (0.085)
EBIT margin+ 0.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.033⁄⁄⁄ 0.021⁄⁄⁄ 0.033⁄⁄⁄
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Asset turnover ratio+ 0.034 0.090 0.016 0.026
(0.091) (0.134) (0.092) (0.133)
CAPEX/Total Assets+ 0.004 0.038⁄⁄⁄ 0.005 0.035⁄⁄⁄
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Turnover growth+ 0.004 0.007⁄⁄ 0.005⁄ 0.009⁄⁄⁄
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Macroeconomics var. Local stock index return 0.008 0.055⁄⁄⁄ 0.009 0.049⁄⁄⁄
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016)
Capital commitment index return 0.086⁄⁄⁄ 0.093⁄⁄ 0.102⁄⁄⁄ 0.089⁄
(0.031) (0.045) (0.034) (0.050)
Fed Tightening Index 0.004 0.012⁄⁄ 0.003 0.013⁄⁄
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Country ﬁxed effects Included Included Not included Not included
Industry ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 972 936 1008 876
LR Chi2 193.25⁄⁄⁄ 224.96⁄⁄⁄ 184.16⁄⁄⁄ 205.8⁄⁄⁄
22 Although, it is possible for a portfolio company to be ﬂoated on overseas stock
exchanges, the local stock exchange is normally the ﬁrst choice because it is where
potential investors have more information about the company and so it is easier to
market the initial public offering.
23
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We hypothesize that the choice of exit route depends on three
groups of factors relating to the investor, the portfolio company
and the market environment. In this section we use a discrete
choice Trinomial Logistic Model to analyze the exit route decision.
3.1. Trinomial Logistic Model and variables
The exit route probability model is based on a trinomial logistic
regression using the exit routes as the dependent variable, which
assumes the value 0 if the exit route is a secondary buy-out, 1 if
it is a trade sale, and 2 if it is an IPO. Deal and private equity inves-
tor characteristics (x), portfolio company characteristics (w) and
macroeconomic environment factors (z) are used as independent
variables to explain the choice of exit route:
yi ¼ x0ibi þw0iki þ z0idi þ ui ð3Þ
The x variables include the fund maturity, represented by the
number of months (at exit) since the vintage year21, the fund size,
and the age of the private equity ﬁrm at the exit date. The w vari-
ables include company size (represented by total assets), company
age, the EBIT margin (as a measure of proﬁtability), the
turnover-assets ratio (as a measure of capital intensity), the
CAPEX-assets ratio (as a measure of investment intensity), and the
growth rate of turnover. All these accounting variables are measured
in the last year before the exit.
Previous work has suggested how these variables may impact
on the exit decision. Pagano et al. (1998) show that the ‘‘larger
companies are more likely to go public’’, mostly because they face
less direct (administrative) and indirect (underpricing) costs.
Gompers (1995), Cumming and Macintosh (2003a) and21 As the exact date of the fund close is unknown, we use July 1 for all funds.
Detailed descriptions of all variables and deﬁnitions are presented in the Appendix.Schwienbacher (2008b) have shown that, due to ﬁxed costs, only
companies above a threshold dimension should be expected to
be exiting through a public offering. Ritter (1991) found a signiﬁ-
cant inverse relationship between underpricing and the age of
the company in a public offering, which is consistent with
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) who showed that, in equilibrium,
ﬁrms go public only when a sufﬁcient amount of information about
them has accumulated in the public domain.
Finally, regarding the macroeconomic environment at the time
of the exit (z), the return on the local stock market index22 is
included as a proxy for the state of the IPO market. The Fed tighten-
ing index is used as proxy for the availability of capital in the credit
market. Finally, the amount of capital available to private equity
investors, sometimes referred to as ‘‘dry-powder’’, is included to
proxy the competitive state of the private equity market.
Dummies variables that control for industry ﬁxed effects and
country ﬁxed effects (in the models without macro country-level
variables) are also included. The existence of outliers made some
distributions relatively skewed and could lead to a distortion of
statistical tests. As a result some variables are measured in natural
logarithms or are winsorized.233.2. Empirical results
Table 7 shows the results for the trinomial model. The sec-
ondary buy-out exit is the comparison class. Separate equationsLogs were used for fund maturity, fund size, private equity ﬁrm age, portfolio
company age and total assets. Winsorization (at the 5% and 95% points) was used only
for variables expressed in percentage points, such as EBIT margin, asset turnover
ratio, CAPEX over total assets, and turnover growth.
Table 8
Secondary buy-out – sellers and buyers descriptive statistics. This table compares characteristics of the selling private equity ﬁrm and funds and the purchasing private equity
ﬁrm and funds involved in secondary buy-outs. The average and median difference is calculated only for the observations in which both selling and purchasing private equity
ﬁrm/fund data is available. Signiﬁcance levels of average difference are based on two-tailed Student t-tests, while signiﬁcance levels of median differences are based on a one-
sample Wilcoxon sign-rank tests. *, **, *** indicate levels that are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Variables Selling PE Purchasing PE Difference
N Average Median N Average Median N Average Median
Panel A: Private Equity Firm
PE age at exit/entry (years) 446 20.0 20.0 438 18.7 19.0 438 1.3⁄⁄ 2.0⁄⁄
Total funds 404 12.6 7 391 11.0 6 356 1.6⁄ 1.0
BO funds 403 6.4 5 368 5.4 4 356 1.2⁄⁄⁄ 1.0⁄⁄⁄
Total amount 404 $8,003 $2,838 391 $7,986 $2,134 332 $227 $5
Total BO funds amount 403 $5,603 $2,127 387 $5,262 $1,066 352 $268 $179⁄
Panel B: Private Equity Fund
Fund maturity at entry (months) 420 25.7 22.3 295 31.9 26.9 274 6.5⁄⁄⁄ 9.1⁄⁄⁄
Fund size 425 $920 $459 277 $1,735 $696 261 $1,001⁄⁄⁄ $311⁄⁄⁄
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ondary buy-out and the probability of an IPO to the probability
of a secondary buy-out.24 Industry ﬁxed effects are included in each
model, and country ﬁxed effects are included in Models 1 and 2, in
which macroeconomic variables do not appear.
We start by including each set of explanatory variables sepa-
rately. These models (1–3) suggest that trade sales are more likely
to be used (relative to secondary sales) by more experienced pri-
vate equity ﬁrms, by smaller funds, at an earlier stage in the fund
life, and for smaller portfolio companies with lower margins.25 The
probability of an IPO is higher earlier in the life of the fund, and for
portfolio companies with higher CAPEX intensity and turnover
growth. We also ﬁnd that the probability of an IPO decreases with
portfolio company proﬁtability (as measured by EBIT margins),
which contradicts the ‘monitoring hypothesis’. These results suggest
that the attractiveness of a secondary sale increases for companies
with high margins and lower capital requirements – both of which
would support the higher debt levels that would be used by sec-
ondary buyers.
Macroeconomic conditions are also found to be signiﬁcant: the
probability of choosing an IPO, over a secondary sale, is higher
when the stock market has been increasing, when credit conditions
have been getting tighter and when capital committed to private
equity decreases.26 Secondary sales are more likely to be chosen
over trade sales when capital committed to private equity is higher,
as would be expected.24 Although the exact value of the coefﬁcient associated with any variable cannot be
directly interpreted, a positive coefﬁcient in the ﬁrst (second) equation means that as
the independent (exogenous) variable increases the ratio ‘‘probability of a trade sale
(public offering)/probability of a secondary buy-out’’ increase, i.e., the probability of a
trade sale (public offering) increases related with the probability of a secondary
buy-out. By contrast, a negative coefﬁcient associated to any variable means that the
probability of a secondary buy-out related to the probability of a trade sale (public
offering) increases as the independent (exogenous) variable increases.
25 One additional year of experience of the private equity ﬁrm (around the mean of
20.3 years) increases the ratio ‘‘probability of a trade sale /probability of a secondary
buy-out’’ by around 1.84%. An increase of private equity fund size by $1 million
(around the mean of $938 million) decreases the ratio ‘‘probability of a trade sale
/probability of a secondary buy-out’’ by around 0.015%. To exit the investment one
month later in the fund life (around the mean of 76.2 months) decreases the ratio
‘‘probability of a trade sale /probability of a secondary buy-out’’ by around 0.46%. An
increase of portfolio company EBIT margin by 1 percentage point decreases the ratio
‘‘probability of a trade sale/probability of a secondary buy-out’’ by around 1.88%.
26 A stock market return higher in 1 percentage point increases the ratio
‘‘probability of a public offering/probability of a secondary buy-out’’ by around
5.65%. An increase of the net number of commercial banks tightening standards for
corporate loans higher in 1 percentage points increases the ratio ‘‘probability of a
public offering /probability of a secondary buy-out’’ by around 1.20%. An increase of
the capital commitment to private equity higher in 1 percentage point decreases the
ratio ‘‘probability of a public offering /probability of a secondary buy-out’’ by around
8.89%.The three sets of explanatory variables are combined in Model
4, and most of the conclusions of the earlier models are conﬁrmed.
The main difference is that the fund characteristics generally
become less signiﬁcant. On the other hand, controlling for the port-
folio company and macroeconomic variables increases the signiﬁ-
cance of fund size for the choice between IPOs and secondary sales:
larger funds are more likely to choose IPOs.
In summary, our results suggest that market conditions, which
provide various windows of opportunity for GPs, are consistently
important across all the speciﬁcations. Loosening credit conditions
increase the probability of secondary sales, and periods of strong
stock market performance and smaller commitments to private
equity increase the probability of IPOs. Such effects are particularly
pronounced for portfolio companies with a high debt capacity.
Axelson et al. (2013) found such macroeconomic factors were crit-
ical determinants of the pricing and capital structure of LBOs; our
results show that they also have a signiﬁcant impact on the way
deals are exited.
4. Selling versus purchasing private equity ﬁrm and fund
characteristics
To this point we have focused on the exit choice for all LBOs in
our sample. However, in this section we focus on the secondary
buyouts and compare the characteristics of the selling and buying
private equity ﬁrms, and the point the primary and secondary
transactions took place in the life of the purchasing fund. For both
the selling and purchasing private equity ﬁrms we gather data
from Thomson One on ﬁrm age, the total number of private equity
funds set up and the total amount raised, up to the date of each
transaction. We further distinguish between private equity funds
in general (including venture capital) and buyout funds.
Table 8, Panel A compares the private equity ﬁrms on each side
of the secondary transactions. The results show that the selling pri-
vate equity ﬁrm is, on average, 1.3 years older than the purchasing
ﬁrm, and this difference is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In terms of
fund formation, the selling ﬁrm had set up an average of 12.6 pri-
vate equity funds – 1.6 more than the purchasing ﬁrm. Focusing
only on the buyout funds the difference is slightly higher and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Regarding the amounts raised, the total for all
fund types is very similar. There is, nonetheless, some evidence
that selling private equity ﬁrms tend to be somewhat more expe-
rienced than purchasing ﬁrms.
We also consider, in Table 8 Panel B, whether sellers and pur-
chasers differ in terms of the point in the fund life at which they
buy the given ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the initial purchases occur, on
average, two years after the vintage year. Interestingly, the sec-
ondary purchases happen, on average, signiﬁcantly later at two
and a half year after the vintage year. We also compare the size
T. Jenkinson, M. Sousa / Journal of Banking & Finance 59 (2015) 399–408 407of the selling and purchasing funds. Purchasing funds are signiﬁ-
cantly larger than selling funds. However, to some extent this sim-
ply reﬂects the fact that capital committed to the private equity
sector and buyout fund sizes were steadily increasing over our
sample period.
This comparison of the parties involved in secondary transac-
tions provides some evidence that, across our sample of deals,
the experienced private equity ﬁrms tend to sell to the less experi-
enced. The previous section provides little evidence to support the
view that secondary transactions are more likely for those compa-
nies that have grown rapidly and could beneﬁt from a new private
equity owner to take them to the next level. If anything, the faster
growing companies tended to exit to trade sales and IPOs.
Therefore, the choice of secondary exit seems to be driven more
by the fund characteristic than portfolio company factors. The fact
that secondary deals tend to happen at a later point in the life of
the purchasing fund than primary deals is intriguing. Most private
equity funds claim that they focus mainly on primary deals, and
our ﬁndings are consistent with funds turning to secondary trans-
actions when they are unable to source sufﬁcient primary deals.
This would suggest, in general, that secondary buyouts should
under-perform primary transactions. Although returns are not
the focus of this paper, Degeorge et al. (2015) conﬁrm this conjec-
ture. They analyze the performance of secondary buyouts and ﬁnd
that, on average, they under-perform relative to primary deals. This
is mainly driven by deals that occur later in the life of the purchas-
ing fund – which they describe as ‘‘going for broke’’.
5. Conclusions
Using a new and comprehensive dataset consisting of all
European companies exited by private equity ﬁrms between
January 2000 and December 2014, this paper analyzes the determi-
nants of exit timing and the exit route. We pay particular attention
to the factors that might explain the growth of secondary transac-
tions between private equity funds, which comprise 43% of the
exits in our sample.
We ﬁnd evidence that the choice between IPOs and secondary
buyouts depends heavily on the conditions in the debt and equity
market. When stock markets have been rising strongly, the use of
IPOs, relative to secondary sales, increases. When debt is abundant
and cheap, and when private equity ﬁrms have a lot of committed
capital to deploy, we observe an increase in secondary buyouts.
Furthermore, these effects are more pronounced for portfolio com-
panies with a higher capacity to service debt – for instance, compa-
nies with higher levels of cash-ﬂow and proﬁtability, and with
lower capital expenditure requirements. The choice between sec-
ondary buyouts and trade sales is inﬂuenced more by portfolio
company characteristics, with trade sales being more likely for
smaller companies that have experienced stronger growth.
The academic literature has tended to view IPOs as the ‘‘suc-
cessful’’ exit route, but our results question whether such status
is warranted. In contrast, many people view secondary buyouts
with suspicion, but from the perspective of the selling private
equity funds – and their investors – secondary buyouts have many
attractions. The price is arrived at through an auction involving
multiple potential purchasers. At closing the purchaser pays the
full price, and the selling fund knows exactly what returns will
be achieved. Investors receive their money back quickly thereafter.
Therefore, to some extent, private equity ﬁrms provide liquidity to
each other via secondary sales.
Contrast this process with the uncertainties of an IPO. At the
start of the IPO process an investment bank gives an indication
as to the likely price, but there is uncertainty about the outcome
until the day before the bookbuilding closes. Often there are
last-minute changes in the issue price, as the investment bankjuggles the interests of the vendor and its buy-side clients. This
inherent conﬂict of interest may go some way to explain the sys-
temic underpricing of IPOs (see, for instance, Jenkinson and Jones
(2009)), which GPs very much view as ‘carried interest left on
the table’. At the IPO, the private equity owner is only able to sell
a proportion of their holding, and is subject to a lengthy lock-up
on the remainder. Selling down the remaining (often large) stakes
can take long periods of time. Therefore, proceeds are highly uncer-
tain and investors do not obtain their money for many months or
years after the IPO. From the perspective of the GP and their inves-
tors, an IPO is not an exit per se; it is a route to an exit.
Therefore, secondary sales have strong attractions from the
viewpoint of the selling private equity funds. However, a rather dif-
ferent case needs to be made to justify secondary purchases. When
we compare the characteristics of the private equity ﬁrms involved
on both sides of secondary transactions, we ﬁnd that the more
experienced private equity ﬁrms tend to sell to the less experi-
enced. We also ﬁnd that secondary deals tend to happen at a later
point in the life of the purchasing fund than the primary deals. This
suggests that funds may tend to buy in secondary transactions
when they cannot source good primary deals. This is consistent
with the ﬁnding of Degeorge et al. (2015) that secondary deals
bought later in the life of a fund tend to underperform.
In conclusion, our results provide support for the ‘window of
opportunity’ hypothesis, and reinforce the recent work by
Axelson et al. (2013) who ﬁnd similarly strong effects of market
conditions on capital structure and pricing of leveraged buyouts.
While the use of secondary buyouts varies with capital market
conditions, and according to the portfolio and fund characteristics
we identify, we expect them to continue to be one of the most
commonly observed exit routes in the future. Private equity funds
are highly incentivized to sell their portfolio companies for the
highest price, with the lowest risk, and with the shortest delay in
receiving the proceeds. Selling to another private equity fund often
achieves these goals.
Appendix. VariablesVariable DeﬁnitionHolding period
(months)(exit day  entry day)/30Fund maturity (months) [(day 1/exit month/exit
year)  (day 1/month 7/vintage
year)]/30Fund size ($m) Closed fund size
Private equity ﬁrm age
at exit (seller) (years)
(exit year  pe ﬁrm founding
year + 1)Portfolio company age
at exit (years)(exit year  pc founding year + 1)Turnover ($m) (total sales value in the last proﬁt
and loss statement before the exit
date)  12/(number of months in
the statement) [annual equivalent]Total assets ($m) Total assets value in the last
accounting statement before the
exit dateEBIT ($m) (total EBIT value in the last proﬁt
and loss statement before the exit
date)  12/(number of months in
the statement) [annual equivalent]EBIT margin (100) (annual equivalent EBIT)/Total
sales  100(continued on next page)
408 T. Jenkinson, M. Sousa / Journal of Banking & Finance 59 (2015) 399–408Appendix (continued)Variable DeﬁnitionCAPEX ($m) Total ﬁxed assets value in the last
accounting statement before the
exit date  total ﬁxed assets value
in the second from the last
accounting statement before the
exit date + depreciation and
amortizations value in the last
proﬁt and loss statement before the
exit dateCAPEX/Total Assets
(100)CAPEX/Total Assets  100Local stock market
return (100)Local index stock exchange
return  100 between six and three
months before the exitCapital commitment
index return (100)Preqin capital commitment index
return  100 in the quarter before
the exitMargins on BB loans ‘‘drawn margins on leveraged
institutional term loans BB’’ in the
quarter before the exitFed index ‘net percentage of domestic
respondents tightening standards
for C&I Loans’  100 in the quarter
before the exitLeverage multiple Leverage multiple in the 3rd month
before the exitNote: All values originally not in USD converted at historical exchange rate.References
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